40 Bicycles

With the advent of the New Perspective, the interpretation of Paul’s epistle to the Romans has been thrown into some confusion. Many have claimed that it is impossible to be an advocate of the New Perspective and still be Reformed. Many believe that the Reformed position depends upon a particular reading of Romans and Galatians and oppose the readings of such New Perspective advocates as N.T. Wright. They could not be more mistaken. Anyone acquainted with the source material of the Reformation will be aware that many different interpretations of the books of Romans and Galatians were flying around at the time. T.H.L. Parker has written a very helpful book, Commentaries on Romans 1532-1542, in which he compares a number of the different commentators on Romans, both Catholic and Protestant, in their reading of particular portions of the epistle. The reader is struck by the differences that existed within the Protestant camp in the understanding of key passages. Parker concludes by writing:—

Now that we have surveyed our authors and their books we must try to draw the separate studies together into something closer than an assembly of individuals. It is not possible to construct a single harmonious interpretation of the passages of Romans, or even two clearly opposed harmonious interpretations. In this respect, the best that can be done is to note agreements in general, agreements in intention and tendency. Nor would it be sensible to attempt to form doctrines out of expositions; this is always a hazardous undertaking, but with such short passages of commentary it would fail in almost every instance to do justice to the author.

I believe that many modern Reformed denominations can learn a lot from this. Many have made a particular reading of Romans 1:16-17 or 3:20-28 normative for the church. Ironically, they have established hoops that many leading Reformers would have been unable to jump through. The Reformed church is huge and encompasses many widely differing readings of Paul. It is hard to think of any exegetical shibboleths which can consistently identify Reformed Christians. The distinctives of the Reformation are primarily theological, not exegetical. Wright stands in the mainstream of the Reformed tradition when it comes to these theological distinctives over against Catholics. He affirms these distinctives in many places. His article, The Shape of Justification is one such place. Some claim that to be ‘Reformed’ is to refuse to have any dealings with Roman Catholics. This is false: Reformers such as Melancthon, Bucer and Calvin were ecumenical in their dealings, both within and beyond the Protestant churches. Has no one heard of the Diet of Regensburg? N.T. Wright’s ecumenism troubles me, but it is far closer to the position of the Reformers mentioned above than the narrow bigotry that masquerades as the Reformed faith in many circles. Wright’s Reformed credentials are far more apparent than those of many of his opponents, who believe that they have moved beyond the need for reformation. We should be shamed by the fact that ad fontes and semper reformanda (two forgotten watchwords of the Reformation) are better exemplified by such as Wright than by many of the theological traditions we find ourselves in. The Reformed tradition is big enough to permit considerable diversity, especially in readings of Paul. Calvin’s more redemptive historical reading of Galatians differs markedly from a more personal-experiential reading advocated by someone like Luther. However, they could both stand alongside each other against the Roman Catholics. Anyone who has read Peter Lillback’s The Binding of God (it is a ‘must read’ for anyone who hasn’t already read it!) will realize that there were significant differences of understanding between Calvin and Luther on questions of justification. Nevertheless, they could both sign the Augsburg Confession. Let’s not be narrow. Wright is not arguing that Luther’s argument against the Roman Catholics was wrong. On the contrary, he agrees with Luther against the Catholics. Wright is arguing against Luther’s reading of Paul. If we can grasp this our heads might be cool enough to understand Wright’s argument and interact with it. Many of the exegetical claims of Wright are not without Reformed precedent. There are traces of many of his claims in the writings of the Reformation. In this post I would like to make some brief comments on two basic issues, the understanding of the phrases dikaiosune theou (‘righteousness of God’) and ergon nomou (‘works of the law’). Anyone acquainted with the source material of the Reformation will be aware that the interpretation of these and other phrases were hotly disputed. There was by no means unanimity on the subject. Calvin interprets the term dikaiosune theou as follows in Romans 1:17:—

I take the righteousness of God to mean, that which is approved before his tribunal; as that, on the contrary, is usually called the righteousness of men, which is by men counted and supposed to be righteousness, though it be only vapor. Paul, however, I doubt not, alludes to the many prophecies in which the Spirit makes known everywhere the righteousness of God in the future kingdom of Christ.

Some explain it as the righteousness which is freely given us by God: and I indeed confess that the words will bear this sense; for God justifies us by the gospel, and thus saves us: yet the former view seems to me more suitable, though it is not what I make much of. Of greater moment is what some think, that this righteousness does not only consist in the free remission of sins, but also, in part, includes the grace of regeneration. But I consider, that we are restored to life because God freely reconciles us to himself, as we shall hereafter show in its proper place.

It should be noticed that Calvin is more bothered to demonstrate that the term does not imply the truth of Roman Catholic teaching than to dogmatize about what the term must mean. Regarding the interpretation of dikaiosune theou Parker writes (regarding Romans 3:21):—

Haresche [a Roman Catholic]: “‘The righteousness of God” is Christ made unto us justification’ — perhaps borrowing from Bucer’s reference to Origin’s interpretation of iustitia as Christ. Bucer refers also to Ambrose (who takes iustitia ‘for the mercy of God pardoning and forgiving sins’, and says that it is called iustitia because it has its origin from the promise: ‘For it is the righteousness of God because he bestows what has been promised’) and Augustine, that it is not ‘manifestata sine lege’, for it is ‘testificata per legem’, but it is manifested ‘sine legis iustitia’. While agreeing with Melanchthon that ‘The righteousness of God signifies the acceptance by which God accepts us’, Bucer wishes to include regeneration and sanctification in his definition of righteousness: ‘Philip Melanchthon takes the righteousness of God here for the acceptance by which God accepts us; this agrees with our own understanding of it as the incomparable goodness revealed in Christ by which he forgives sins and imputes righteousness and bestows eternal life; and he initiates it by inbreathing a new mind and a devotion to godliness’. Calvin is undecided whether iustitia is man’s righteousness or God’s: ‘It is doubtful why he calls the righteousness which we obtain by faith the righteousness of God. Either because it alone stands firm before God, or because it is that which the Lord in his mercy bestows on us. Either interpretation fits in well and we do not argue for the one side or the other’.

Bucer’s reading of dikaiosune theou would be taken for New Perspective theology in many circles! I think that it is doubtful whether Calvin’s opposition to an interpretation maintaining ‘that this righteousness does not only consist in the free remission of sins, but also, in part, includes the grace of regeneration’ was designed as an attack on his mentor Bucer’s interpretation. Bucer approaches the interpretation from a very different direction, taking dikaiosune theou as an action on God’s part, rather than as a more abstract quality by which (in some manner or other—imputation, impartation, etc.) we are made righteous. Regarding the interpretation of ergon nomou Parker writes:—

A major disagreement appears at once on the word lex. The larger number take it as a reference to the whole Law in all its parts; but now a few restrict it to the ceremonial Law alone. For the whole Law are Bullinger, Caietan, Calvin, Melanchthon, Pellicanus, and Sadoleto. Thus, … Calvin: ‘The phrase “the works of the law” is taken in two ways by the learned. Some extend it to the observance of the whole Law, others restrict it to ceremonies. The addition of the word “law” moved Chysostom, Origen, and Jerome to agree with the former [this should probably read ‘latter’—it does in some editions of Calvin’s works] view. They thought that the addition contained a particular connotation that the word should not be understood only of works in general. … And they argue from the Epistle to the Galatians, where, when Paul treats of the same subject, he writes only of ceremonies … But with good reason we contend that Paul is here treating of the whole Law’. … But Bucer: ‘He concludes from his premises that none can be justified by the ceremonies of the Law’; and again: ‘ceremonies, about which alone is the argument, are called in this place “the works of the law”’ … And in this place the Apostle thus calls the ceremonies of the Law (which are a part of the things commanded in the Law) by autonomasia or synecdoche’. The following passage suggests that Calvin’s reference to Galatians was perhaps directed against Bucer: ‘By “the works of the law” Paul meant the ceremonies of Moses. So that this was the whole question that he was disputing, both here and in the Epistle to the Galatians… The holy fathers think the same thing about the works of the law. Only Augustine contends that by the works of the law all the precepts of the Law, even the Decalogue, are to be understood… But we agree with the holy fathers that the Apostle meant here by “the works of the law” particularly to express ceremonies… De caeremoniis enim erat omnis quaestio’.

The New Perspective reading of Paul is not as much of a novelty as some might like us to believe. Whilst it is still properly called ‘new’, it has a strong claim to be a legitimate development of historical and, more particularly, Reformed readings of Paul. Its understanding of terms such as ergon nomou and dikaiosune theou are not without precedent in the Reformed tradition, a tradition that is broader than the minds of some of those who inhabit it.